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Chapter Seven

he overcomes by learning to backward-will through circular and recurring time.
6 Nietzsche uses this same metaphor of gravity when he has the dwarf whisper
mockingly to Zarathustra that every stone.that is thrown up must fall back down,
and that Zarathustra, the philosopher’s stone, has thrown himself up high but is
now sentenced to being stoned by himself as he falls back down upon himself (Z:
3 “On the Vision and the Riddle” §2).
7 Seung (2005, 103, 123-124, 131, 180) conflates the intra-cyclical determinism of
linear time with the trans-cyclical determinism of circular time and is therefore not
able to see how Nietzsche looks to our interaction with the latter as a solution to
our problems resulting from the former.
8 In an unpublished note from 1884 (KSA 11:25[7]), Nietzsche has Zarathustra
spell out the compatibility of intra-cyclical novelty and trans-cyclical repetition
(Loeb 2010, 17, 142; Loeb 2012).
9 As I argue in Loeb 2010, 14-16, scholars have missed this point because they
have imagined that a memory of the last cycle would add something different to
the next cycle. But Nietzsche’s point is that the memory is acquired in every
cycle, including the last cycle, and that there has never been an original, or first,
cycle in which the memory was not yet acquired.
10 In Loeb 2010, 138-145, I explain how Nietzsche indicates that it is
Zarathustra’s disciples, and not the higher men, who are the ancestors of the
superhuman in virtue of awakening their own latent knowledge of eternal
recurrence.

In: Yunus Tuncel, ed., Nietzsche and Transhumanism: Precursor or Enemy?
(Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2017)

Chapter Eight
Nietzsche’s Post-Human Imperative:
On the “All-too-Human”
Dream of Transhumanism
.
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To the extent that we are always ahead of ourselves, always beyond
ourselves, the human being is almost inherently metaphysieal. And when
Nietzsche characterizes the human being as the not-as-yet-determined, the
unfinished, the all-too-vague animal — “Er ist das noch nicht festgestellte
Thief’ (KSA 11, 25 [428], 125) — he plays on this being-ahead-ofourselves, being-beyond-ourselves quality, as our specifically unqualified
quality. We can call this adaptability, many call it intelligence, and this
same meta-physicality is also what makes us the religious animal par
excellence: the animal that, rmlike other animals, not only has beliefs but
can hang on to them blindly and that until its dying day.' It is accordingly
also what we could call our human exceptionalism: our conviction that we
are other, higher, better-than other animals, a belief that the ancient
Greeks, as Nietzsche also noted, were able to advance to the insight that
allowed them a kind of moral superiority to the gods themselves. More
than the Judeao-Christian ideal of creation in the image of the Divine but
in some fashion ‘better’ than the gods, the human being judged his gods.
All peoples, not only the Greeks, rate their gods — our god is higher, your
divinities are lesser, indeed false gods, empty fantasies, mere and only
idols. Thus the human being, as Nietzsche also argued, invented truth and
used it to prop up the furniture of the beyond, contra the immediate,
sensible, real, and all and always to his own advantage, at least as long as
hp could hold on to or maintain what he thus called truth as truth.
And as human beings, we also have fashions. Once upon a time there
was the belief in the Jewish god, the god of pride, the god of the original
Bible, a God who required that his people hold to him above all other
gods, a people singularized by any manner of suffering and exile as proof
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of his glory and his inscrutability. By contrast, the God of the New
Testament, the Christian god, as Nietzsche writes, presented the sorriest
spectacle of all the gods: needing not honor or devotion or glorification but
desperate for love and, a god, like anyone who needs love, of destitution,
abjection, pity.
Today we have science. Even more than that, we have our belief or
faith in science, a faith which has long since replaced the aseetic ideal
corresponding to the divine compact that drove the old and new
testaments. And today, we “machinists and bridge builders of the future”
(BGE §14), expect to fabricate ourselves. And with all the practice we
have in the invisible, in the virtual appearances that play on our computer
and tablet screens and cell-phone displays, we see ourselves as no longer
the beings we happen to be (human, all-too-human) but we are our
machines, we are our internet connections, iPads or tablets, cellphones,
little Apple watches. On Facebook, on Instagram or Twitter, texting and
sharing our location automatically, triangulating our lives with and above
all into the web, we are (already) transhuman. Hence we can well imagine
that with an implant, be it of a chip, a lens, a titanium joint, or some time
ago — before a certain scandal, with murder, made the example an
awkward one — with new curved blades as legs,^ or new ears, or the new
kidneys we hope (very soon) to harvest fi-om pig-human chimeras,^ there
will be no limit at all, so we imagine, to what we can be, or at least, in the
‘cloud,’ given the vistas of cyberspace, or at least given the cartographical
conceits of a range of gaming domains (seemingly going back no further
than Robert E. Howard or maybe J.R. Tolkien),'* it is argued there will be
no limits to where we can travel or set up shop, and ‘love’ and ‘live.’
Tethered to a keyboard, tapping with squinting attention on a cell-phone
screen, we proclaim ourselves limitless: scholars tell one another and any
popular ear inclined to listen that human beings are (already) transhuman,
(already) humanity 2.0.^ Welcome to the online, coimected, networked,
virtual, digital realm. Welcome to your finger on a keyboard, tapping a
screen or even, although the kinks in that are not yet worked out in detail,
traced, outlined in air. And we might wonder about the relationship
between Minority Report's air tracing gestures and the voice commands
favored on Star Trek, do such films program our desires for technology, or
anticipate them, spontaneously? And some murmur that with Siri, the
“new” iPhone already — there’s that ‘already’ word again — did all this,
generations ago now.
In his essay “Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism,”* Stefan
Sorgner challenges those who seek to keep a distance between the
transhumanist movement and any connection with Nietzsche’s thought.

For Sorgner the danger that is anticipated here is an already foregone
conclusion. And as he muses, had Nietzsche known of transhumanism, he
would have been, because so Sorgner muses, he could only have been,
sympathetic with the ideal. The only dissonance is a sheerly mechanical
one, rather to the extent that transhumanism was once named via
eybemetics, and hence associated with Donna Haraway’s ‘cyborgs,’ but
this dissonance seems to vanish with Ray Kurzweil’s projection of the
‘technological singularity,’ as an automatic human machine mind-meld, a
becoming-machine. More exigent writers will note that Kurzweil himself
simply takes over or “borrows” the language and the science fantasy
assumptions of the San Diego computer scientist and science fiction
writer, Vemor Vinge.’ Rather more gingerly than Kurzweil (and this is
true in almost every respect), Vinge contextualizes the language of what
he called “the technological singularity” as a techno-theoretical trump
card, explained by the cyberneticist Vinge with reference to John von
Neumann (where it should be noted that the reference to von Neumann
exemplifies a fairly ecstatic conventionality that is a staple in the science
fiction world, as Vinge celebrates von Neumann in his fiction as a “Dawn
Age genius.”)*
The reference to a new ‘davra’ is significant and it should be noted that
founding fathers, this is what I meant by calling this a sci-fi staple, fi'om
Ray Bradbury to Clark and Asimov (and it doesn’t get more staple than
that), are permitted any number of limitations because one needs them,
just like a real father, for legitimacy’s sake. Here the abstraet of Vinge’s
1993 lecture on the technological singularity is worth citing and it has a
certain pxmchy quality, as abstracts go:
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Within thirty years, we will have the technologieal means to create
superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended.®

Vinge cites Stanisfaw Ulam as reporting von Neumann in conversation
on
the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of
human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential
singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we
know them, could not continue.’*

As Vinge points out (in a parenthesis drawn fi'om Gunther Stent), von
Neumann himself
even uses the term singularity, though it appears he is thinking of normal
progress, not the creation of superhuman intellect. (For me, the
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superhumanity is the essence of the Singularity. Without that we would get
a glut of technical riches, never properly absorbed ...”

future, would be so very intrigued by their past to the extent of running
“detailed simulations” of the same past.
Here what interests me is the rhetorical gambit and it depends on
authority for its functioning. Paul Feyerabend has recalled the mechanism
of such authoritative, which is what I mean by trump-card type, references.
Thus for Feyerabend (the context was a recollection of physics debates of
the 1930s through the 1950s),

In the context of the technological singularity, including, as if for good
measure, a reference to superhumanity, Vinge’s contextualization requires
— as all insider-style comments require — a context. There are a lot of
such references on the theme of the human-superhuman continuum and I
would recommend unpacking them with the help of Gunther Anders or
Peter Sloterdijk or even, to be more esoteric, Jean Baudrillard or Paul
Virilio, on one side of the tale, and of any number of more or less
triumphalist futurists on the other, I like to think of Vanevar Bush and
Hermann Kahn but it is more conventional to think of Marshall McLuhan
(it was his centennial ‘year’ in 2011) or Alvin Toffler. For his part, Vinge
whom I met in San Diego, is fond of citing Erik Drexler and the seemingly
out of touch nuclear power enthusiast (damn the radiation and all the other
details). Freeman Dyson, in addition to Marvin Minsky and others.'^
Although it is my point in what follows that Nietzsche offers us a good
deal of help philosophically, it is hard to come to terms with triumphalist
futurists without going all Frankfurt school on them and the rhetoric of
Vinge’s abstract illustrates why. First you posit, as Vinge does (echoing
Ulam who was himself echoing von Neumann), the “imminent creation by
technology of entities with greater than human intelligence.”'^ Having
said that this is somehow to be done by an as yet to be unspecified
technology (Vinge, a computer scientist is himself vague here), and without
fully specifying what a ‘greater than hrnnan intelligence’ would look like
or, indeed, how we human beings with our specifiedly lesser degree of
intelligence would be able to recognize such a ‘higher’ intelligence to
begin with, today’s futurists debate the projected consequences supposed
likely.
This is a sales pitch: having invented “superhuman intelligence” (never
mind the details) the pitch continues with the declaration that “the human
era will be ended”'"' and thus one must plan accordingly. The rest is
science fiction and it’s well worth reading. In philosophy of a certain kind
the argument may be varied slightly yielding Bostrom’s influential 2001
speculation concerning life as a computer simulation, AI variations, and
parallel universes.'^ Bostrom takes his own point of departure with the
assumption that the sort of thing “later generations might do with their
super-powerful computers” would likely be to “run detailed simulations of
their forebears or of people like their forebears.”'^ It is thus supposed that
they would have nothing better to do and it is further supposed that they,
unlike ourselves, fascinated as we are by speculations concerning the

105

the discussion usually went like this. First the defenders of the second
interpretation presented their arguments. Then the opponents raised
objections. The objections were occasionally quite formidable and could
not be easily answered. Then somebody said “but von Neumann has
shown ...” and with that the opposition was silenced.”

'Continuing in this spirit, one might well suppose that Sorgner’s own
arguments would support a claim for Nietzsche’s sympathies for or
afifmities with cybernetics or cyborgs (such as the new ‘digital’ Dionysus
inspired by, among others, Friedrich Kittler)'® as indeed for the technological
singularity to come, now articulated as simply another way of parsing
eternal recurrence.
But Sorgner does not do this and he also opts to defer engaging with the
specific reasons articulated by other transhumanists who vigorously attempt
to maintain a distance from Nietzsche. Instead (and it should be noted that
this is characteristic of a certain kind of philosophical formation), Sorgner
proceeds to tell us what Nietzsche would have “liked.” Thus we are
informed that Nietzsche would have been an advocate of transhumanism. If
I myself do not find this claim especially plausible, this does not mean that
I do not understand Sorgner’s reasons for making such a claim. Hence I
agree that whatever Nietzsche was, he was no traditional humanist, not at
least of the garden-variety sort (unless we take that garden, as some do, to
have been an Epicurean garden, just as Nietzsche heard this garden
reference, all meteorological expression/comprehension,'® including
allusions to Lucretius^® as well as Diogenes Laertius and not less to what
Nietzsche apotheosizes as “personality,” which last term turns out to
matter a great deal for today’s transhumanism — avatars and bots
anyone?), as his thinking on the human, all-too-human includes all the
complexities that were masks for Descartes (there is a reason that
Nietzsche cites Descartes as epigraph to his Human, all-too-Human). And
in the spirit of internet cloaking devices,^' we should add that if Nietzsche
appreciated one thing about Descartes, it was the mask. “Everything
profound loves a mask." (BGE §40)
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Sorgner’s work is not masked and one of the great strengths of
Sorgner’s work is this very straightforward quality. Hence and from the
start, Sorgner reminds us that

emphasizing both Nietzsche’s critique of religion and morality in addition
to xmderscoring Nietzsche’s regard for science and scientific thinking.
As Sorgner argues, Nietzsche can be aligned with those who favor
what transhumanists call “human enhancements” to the extent that “human
beings strive for power” and, so Sorgner continues to make what turns out
to be his crucial argumentative point: “If you will power, then it is in your
interest to enhance yourself.”^* For Sorgner, this point can be taken as
supporting the case that Nietzsche could well have been said to
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When I first became familiar with the transhumanist movement, I
immediately thought that there were many fundamental similarities
between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially
concerning the concept of the posthuman and that of Nietzsche’s
overhuman.^^

But, as Sorgner reflects, apparently with some surprise: a good many
transhumanists seem anxious to refuse this coordination. In addition,
Jurgen Habermas, opposing the transhumanist movement, concurs with
Sorgner’s reading, in an inverse direction,^^ such that Habermas refuses in
his own account what Sorgner embraces in his. Now, it seems to me, one
can hardly be surprised at this, for Habermas had long opposed Nietzsche
in a number of other respects.^“ Thus, and this has changed the landscape
and indeed the intrinsically critical force of critical theory, Habermas
differs from the perspective of either an Adorno or a Horkheimer or even a
Marcuse, all of whom had more specifically critical tolerance for
Nietzsche’s own brand of critical thinking. It should, but it does not, go
without saying that what Anglo-American philosophers (analytic, broadly
conceived, that is: mainstream philosophy) call “critical thmkmg”
(meaning thinking that takes an avowedly pro-science perspective) has
nothing in common with either Nietzsche or classical critical theory
though it does have some elements in common with Habermas.
Sorgner seeks to coordinate Nietzsche and transhumanism point for
point, in part by citing Nick Bostrom’s contention that just as
transhumanists tend to “view human nature as a work-in-progress,”^^
Nietzsche likewise adheres to “a dynamic will-to-power metaphysics
which applies to human and all other beings, and which implies that all
things are permanently undergoing some change.”^® So far, so good, one
might say. Yet the argumentative parallel in its further projection turns out
to cause trouble for Sorgner. Hence and beyond what he calls “ontological
dynamics,”^^ Sorgner locates additional parallels on the level of values, the
same level that is important for Bostrom as for his own part, Bostrom
argues for a normative appreciation of the transhuman. For Bostrom, this
is related to the demarcation of risk analysis that appeals to the speculative
projections critical for research of this kind quite independently of
an5dhing so trivially ontic as actual research about actual options. Too
empirical, one imagines and this, so it may be argued, is the arch nature of
futurology. In his own discussion, Sorgner begins, rightly I believe, by

107

have been in favour of genetic engineering, even though he mainly stresses
the importance of education for the occurrence of the evolutionary step
towards the overhuman. If genetic engineering, or liberal eugenics, can
actually be seen as a special type of education, which is what
transhumanists seem to hold, then it is possible that this position would
have been held by Nietzsche, too, as education played a significant role in
his ethics. He affirmed science, and he was in favour of enhancement, and
the bringing about of the overhuman.^’

Thus we may reconstruct Sorgner’s (and not only Sorgner’s) chained
conventionality here: education = evolution = genetic engineering, noting
to be sure that both education and genetic evolution are here regarded as
kinds of proactive ‘evolution.’ Hence and just as Bostrom argues that we
should seek to broaden ourselves, Sorgner similarly seeks to argue that this
same broadening corresponds to just what Nietzsche meant by self
overcoming. For Sorgner,
Higher humans wish to permanently overcome themselves, to become
stronger in the various aspects which can get developed in a human being,
so that finally the overhuman ean come into existence. In transhumanist
thought, Nietzsche’s overhuman is being referred to as “posthuman.”^”

Patently, Sorgner distinguishes Nietzsche’s post-human from other
transhumanist definitions of the posthuman in order to demonstrate that
Nietzsche’s Ubermensch or overhuman is the posthuman.^' In every case,
so Sorgner eontends, Nietzsche would have been in favor of enhancement
and Sorgner thinks it plausible to suppose that (and at this would be at the
very least) Nietzsche believed in a certain transhumanist possibility
corresponding in turn to his teaching of the overhuman.
Sorgner goes further in this regard by noting that where the
transhumanists fail to provide a basis for their teaching of the transhuman,
Nietzsche does provide sueh a basis, with the consequence that on
Sorgner’s reading just this fundament explains the “relevance of the
overhuman for his philosophy. The overhuman may even be the ultimate
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have been in favour of genetic engineering, even though he mainly stresses
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his ethics. He affirmed science, and he was in favour of enhancement, and
the bringing about of the overhuman.^’
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kinds of proactive ‘evolution.’ Hence and just as Bostrom argues that we
should seek to broaden ourselves, Sorgner similarly seeks to argue that this
same broadening corresponds to just what Nietzsche meant by self
overcoming. For Sorgner,
Higher humans wish to permanently overcome themselves, to become
stronger in the various aspects which can get developed in a human being,
so that finally the overhuman ean come into existence. In transhumanist
thought, Nietzsche’s overhuman is being referred to as “posthuman.”^”

Patently, Sorgner distinguishes Nietzsche’s post-human from other
transhumanist definitions of the posthuman in order to demonstrate that
Nietzsche’s Ubermensch or overhuman is the posthuman.^' In every case,
so Sorgner eontends, Nietzsche would have been in favor of enhancement
and Sorgner thinks it plausible to suppose that (and at this would be at the
very least) Nietzsche believed in a certain transhumanist possibility
corresponding in turn to his teaching of the overhuman.
Sorgner goes further in this regard by noting that where the
transhumanists fail to provide a basis for their teaching of the transhuman,
Nietzsche does provide sueh a basis, with the consequence that on
Sorgner’s reading just this fundament explains the “relevance of the
overhuman for his philosophy. The overhuman may even be the ultimate
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foundation for his Worldview.”^^ This foundational and systematic
advantage permits Sorgner to offer the coordinate argument that to the
extent that the “overhuman represents the meaning of the earth,” it can
only be “in the interest of higher humans to permanently overcome
themselves.”^^ Key for Sorgner is the focus not on the afterlife, which
Sorgner here conceives in a fairly traditionally enlightened parallel or
coordination with a focus on science rather than and by contrast with
traditional religion, but on meaning instead.
And yet, as we have noted, Sorgner chooses not to take his point of
departure by inquiring into the reasons Bostrom and Habermas in addition
to others including, albeit for different reasons, the musically and
creatively content-concerned Jaron Lanier^'* — all of whom do tend to
seek to keep Nietzsche at a distance. Indeed: many in the current context
of cybemetics-cum-cyborg lifestyle exclude any and all references to
Nietzsche, not least perhaps because such references inevitably involve a
number of historical and historicist issues. These are observations on his
opponents not eternal truths and one might think that Sorgner would first
offer at least a preliminary reflection, if not on Bostrom (whom he does
consider) or Lanier (whom Sorgner does not consider, just as Sorgner also
excludes reflection on Peter Sloterdijk and Gunther Anders, both of whom
I already mentioned and to whom I return below) then perhaps, at the very
least, on the reasons Habermas advances for finding it necessary to argue
contra the transhumanist movement and indeed regarding Habermas’s
reasons for assimilating Nietzsche to the same movement.
I am not here advocating the Habermasian side per se. But I am
suggesting that it is essential to advert to Habermas’s constellation of
arguments here as these are also specific to a set of concerns that had
already in another more controversial and related context pitted Habermas
contra Sloterdijk’s infamous Elmau lecture. Rules for the Human Zoo.
Here the obvious merits attention, and not just because what one takes to
be “obvious” is often less well known than one supposes. For Habermas’s
opposition to Nietzsche and a range of other thinkers in a broad swath
tends to include Martin Heidegger but also Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Jacques Derrida, and latterly Sloterdijk, and if Sorgner is not careful here,
Sorgner himself (not that this is not a great set of companions in thought).
For his own part, Sloterdijk^® seems concordant with Sorgner, to the
extent that Sloterdijk recommends that we read otherwise esoteric
cybernetic theorists like Gotthard Gunther, notably his 196j book. The
Consciousness of Machines: A Metaphysics of Cybernetics. Gunther
himself, a German-American systems thinker,^* echoes an audaciously
technological optimism which we may recognize as sympathetic to

Sorgner’s transhumanism. As Sloterdijk explains it, we find in Gunther’s
work
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the concept of a “formless matter” [that] embodies ... all that’s been
thought between Hegel and Turing on the relation of “things” to “mind.” It
tests out a trivalent—or multivalent—logic that’s so potent it could rid us
of the impotent, bmtal binarism of the mind/thing, subject/object,
idea/matter type..
I should add that it matters here that Sloterdijk also recommends the
cybernetician, in today’s terms, we should say the theoretical neuroscientist,
Warren McCulloch, who was “junior,” as Sloterdijk reminds us, helping
us keep our time consciousness here, to Norbert Weiner.'*® Indeed, there is
nothing like cybernetics and systems theory and its allure has animated the
military industrial world, especially but not only in the United States.
Sorgner could do worse than to turn to Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical
Reason, especially the bits at the end, where Sloterdijk is able to argue that
futurists like Toffler and McLuhan (again, not rmlike Kurzweil as noted
above),'** are for their own futuristic part surprisingly dependent upon an
earlier generation of thinkers, not so much cold war but pre-World War (II
& I) thinkers, like Friedrich Dessauer, but also Walter Rathaus, and Adrien
Turel in a decidedly uncanny context that was the crucible for the
particular fascism that grew out of the Weimar Republic on Sloterdijk’s
account.
If we add these bits of context to the transhumanist debate, Habermas
and his opposition to Nietzsche comes into rather better focus.
Hence it is not too surprising that some will find it hard not to think of
Ray Kurzweil’s (or should one not say, at least to respect the interest of
copyright, Vinge’s/Ulam’s/von Neumaim’s?) “technological singularity”
or what I already opted to name, via Star Trek, the machine-human mindmeld, when Sloterdijk reflects upon his Rules for the Human Zoo noting
that
its strong epistemological linkage between concepts like ‘Dionysian
materialism’ and ‘vitalism,’ a linkage made even more interesting by the
fact that the life sciences and life technics have just passed into a new
phase of their development.'*^
Beyond the debate internal to the politics of German public
intellectuals, the theme for Sloterdijk is anthropotechnics: the technique of
the manufacture of humanity, and it is not a German but a global concern:
Nietzsche and Plato have invited themselves to the ‘symposium’ to
comment on the ideas of Heidegger, to put forward their opinions on the
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drama played out in the clearing. The title of this drama?
Anthropotechnics or: How human beings produce themselves. And
suddenly everyone wants to be invited, everyone — dramatically — wants
to be part of the debate, to take part in it.'*^

organisms usually do, be they sheep or mice or Korean puppies for the
clone-your-Shi-Tzu market (with all the future woe this betides for the
ethically catastrophic dog cloning commercial enterprise, speaking not of
whether one should but of the consequences for those who do, quite apart
from the dozens and dozens of dogs killed to ‘manufacture’ this one quasi
identical dog — but what is identity? the philosophers ask). Hence with all
the troubles facing hard science, soft science, the science of clouds and
apps that is the stuff of the coming technological rapture, vague as it is,
may promise more success. Can’t get Apple and IBM to play right? Make
a virtual machine, dual boot it (at least for the minority still capable of
doing that these days): Apple and IBM still won’t play right but you won’t
know it.'*^ Or maybe, owing to otu own contouring of our own
consciousness to the limits and constraints of the digital interface, be it
that of email or of gaming or of the increasingly ubiquitous social
networking (Facebook now appeals to the young, and the old and
everyone in between, despite the social horror that it is for teens to ‘friend’
their parents), we increasingly find the flatness of computer-enhanced
experience exactly as charming as its purveyors claim. Go Pokemon.
Here we note the very specific (and very popularly Nietzschean)
“faith” in science as we began by discussing this faith and the industrial,
corporate, capitalist technology that has, if we read Sloterdijk aright, been
with us since the interregnum between the two wars. But this is again and
also to say that such a vision cannot but be fascist through and through.
All this gives us is another reason to ‘prepare’ for the coming singularity.
But that may be less than or at least other than anticipated. And as with
other religious raptures, one does not expect to have a choice. And one
thinks this no matter how underwhelming the experience turns out to be in
actual experience.
Like Conrad,'*® the object of fan-girl affection in a bygone musical, we
“love” our iPhones — O yes we do. Here what matters is not affect as
much as brand loyalty — O Conrad, well be true. Even with all its
limitations, we are happy to say: O iPhone, we love you.'^^
Along with the idealized expectation of technological rapture goes a
vision of technological oversimplification that is not quite a result of our
being closer and closer to a future we once imagined. In other words, it is
significant that talk of 2045 was once upon a time talk of unimaginably
distant era, as was talk of 2012. Or 1998 — which was indeed and to be
sure, and this-matters immensely, the projected future for the 1968
American television series Lost in Space.

Sloterdijk’s point is increasingly relevant and the message of
Kurzweil’s vision of the ‘technological singularity’ as it has been
embraced by (at least some elements of) popular culture, when it is not the
message of the genome project or stem cells, is indeed anthropotechnics,
which is all about not becoming the one you are but, and to be sure
becoming the one you wish you were, the one you ‘should have’ been all
along.
Call this the Harry Potter effect, or everyone is a boy wizard, quidditch
player, best in sports, all secret greatness and unfair discrimination, at
least, in the germ, at least until after the singularity: in just the way that it
may be argued that we have been transhuman all the while we have, in
Bruno Latour’s words “never been modern,”^'' it can and has repeatedly
been claimed that everything will be perfect after the revolution. For
Marx, this was the revolution he famously failed to locate rightly, not in
his industrial England or even in his Germany but and however
disastrously and unsustainably where it did change the world in Russia and
(still ongoing) in a China that is today increasingly indistinguishable from
a capitalist regime (just ask the international financier Maurice Strong or
for the same answer from a different source, ask Zizek). Apart from Marx,
and closer to home, the “revolution” that was promised to change
everything, at least when I was eleven going on twelve, was a socio
cultural, leftist revolution, that was the revolution of the 1968 generation
as it played itself into nothing but the idols of the market: lots of music,
drugs, distractions of sex and the compulsion to announce one’s erotic
orientation to the world. So we ask, which revolution? The technological
revolution, of course. And who announces this but those who market the
same? The technological singularity is suspiciously not unlike a Coke
commercial. We are the world.
Technology, qua transhmnanist conventionality, has an ever growing
appeal, more than the vision of the robotics of the Asimovian past, and this
may be, perhaps, traced to certain stubborn limitations in cognate fields.
Practically minded as I am, I like to suppose that this may be because the
biological business of genetic engineering, retro-fitting genes, and such
like, has not been going as well as anticipated, perhaps owing to the pesky
detail that genes work badly on the model of add-a-gene-and-stir varieties
of genetic engineering but also that cloning adult organisms seems to
produce young organisms that senesce and die markedly faster than young

111

110

Chapter Eight

Nietzsche’s Post-Human Imperative

drama played out in the clearing. The title of this drama?
Anthropotechnics or: How human beings produce themselves. And
suddenly everyone wants to be invited, everyone — dramatically — wants
to be part of the debate, to take part in it.'*^

organisms usually do, be they sheep or mice or Korean puppies for the
clone-your-Shi-Tzu market (with all the future woe this betides for the
ethically catastrophic dog cloning commercial enterprise, speaking not of
whether one should but of the consequences for those who do, quite apart
from the dozens and dozens of dogs killed to ‘manufacture’ this one quasi
identical dog — but what is identity? the philosophers ask). Hence with all
the troubles facing hard science, soft science, the science of clouds and
apps that is the stuff of the coming technological rapture, vague as it is,
may promise more success. Can’t get Apple and IBM to play right? Make
a virtual machine, dual boot it (at least for the minority still capable of
doing that these days): Apple and IBM still won’t play right but you won’t
know it.'*^ Or maybe, owing to otu own contouring of our own
consciousness to the limits and constraints of the digital interface, be it
that of email or of gaming or of the increasingly ubiquitous social
networking (Facebook now appeals to the young, and the old and
everyone in between, despite the social horror that it is for teens to ‘friend’
their parents), we increasingly find the flatness of computer-enhanced
experience exactly as charming as its purveyors claim. Go Pokemon.
Here we note the very specific (and very popularly Nietzschean)
“faith” in science as we began by discussing this faith and the industrial,
corporate, capitalist technology that has, if we read Sloterdijk aright, been
with us since the interregnum between the two wars. But this is again and
also to say that such a vision cannot but be fascist through and through.
All this gives us is another reason to ‘prepare’ for the coming singularity.
But that may be less than or at least other than anticipated. And as with
other religious raptures, one does not expect to have a choice. And one
thinks this no matter how underwhelming the experience turns out to be in
actual experience.
Like Conrad,'*® the object of fan-girl affection in a bygone musical, we
“love” our iPhones — O yes we do. Here what matters is not affect as
much as brand loyalty — O Conrad, well be true. Even with all its
limitations, we are happy to say: O iPhone, we love you.'^^
Along with the idealized expectation of technological rapture goes a
vision of technological oversimplification that is not quite a result of our
being closer and closer to a future we once imagined. In other words, it is
significant that talk of 2045 was once upon a time talk of unimaginably
distant era, as was talk of 2012. Or 1998 — which was indeed and to be
sure, and this-matters immensely, the projected future for the 1968
American television series Lost in Space.

Sloterdijk’s point is increasingly relevant and the message of
Kurzweil’s vision of the ‘technological singularity’ as it has been
embraced by (at least some elements of) popular culture, when it is not the
message of the genome project or stem cells, is indeed anthropotechnics,
which is all about not becoming the one you are but, and to be sure
becoming the one you wish you were, the one you ‘should have’ been all
along.
Call this the Harry Potter effect, or everyone is a boy wizard, quidditch
player, best in sports, all secret greatness and unfair discrimination, at
least, in the germ, at least until after the singularity: in just the way that it
may be argued that we have been transhuman all the while we have, in
Bruno Latour’s words “never been modern,”^'' it can and has repeatedly
been claimed that everything will be perfect after the revolution. For
Marx, this was the revolution he famously failed to locate rightly, not in
his industrial England or even in his Germany but and however
disastrously and unsustainably where it did change the world in Russia and
(still ongoing) in a China that is today increasingly indistinguishable from
a capitalist regime (just ask the international financier Maurice Strong or
for the same answer from a different source, ask Zizek). Apart from Marx,
and closer to home, the “revolution” that was promised to change
everything, at least when I was eleven going on twelve, was a socio
cultural, leftist revolution, that was the revolution of the 1968 generation
as it played itself into nothing but the idols of the market: lots of music,
drugs, distractions of sex and the compulsion to announce one’s erotic
orientation to the world. So we ask, which revolution? The technological
revolution, of course. And who announces this but those who market the
same? The technological singularity is suspiciously not unlike a Coke
commercial. We are the world.
Technology, qua transhmnanist conventionality, has an ever growing
appeal, more than the vision of the robotics of the Asimovian past, and this
may be, perhaps, traced to certain stubborn limitations in cognate fields.
Practically minded as I am, I like to suppose that this may be because the
biological business of genetic engineering, retro-fitting genes, and such
like, has not been going as well as anticipated, perhaps owing to the pesky
detail that genes work badly on the model of add-a-gene-and-stir varieties
of genetic engineering but also that cloning adult organisms seems to
produce young organisms that senesce and die markedly faster than young

111

Chapter Eight

Nietzsche’s Post-Human Imperative

To see this it is worth thinking a bit about Aubrey de Grey, a software
developer or programmer who, having learnt sufficient biolo^ for the
purpose,''* has been arguing that we can resist aging if we avoid its causes,
to wit the oxidation of cells and the build-up of waste products in those
same cells. Having determined that it is the mitochondria that develop
problems or ‘damage’ by getting gunked-up (or losing ‘efficiency’), de
Grey proposes that we send in little nanobots to clean them out (or indeed,
as de Grey also imagines, as so many mechanical replacements). What de
Grey has in mind is close to the miniaturized spaceships of Fantastic
Voyage,the 1966 film of Raquel Welch’s travels on a microscopic level,
which film title just happens to accord with one of KurzweiTs first books
for his ventures into techmological rapture. Grey is vague on the details of
designing and implementing such a nanobot brigade.
De Grey not only runs an anti-aging foimdation (and one supposes that
he has all manner of highly motivated and well-heeled investors backing
him) but also has an appointment on the faculty of Ray KurzweiTs
Singularity University).^" For it turns out that it is less about biology than
technology and marketing, precisely in the way we relate to technology as
those who have, as firlly vested heirs of a cargo cult, grown up with
devices we know how to use from electric appliances, toilets (to be
Illichian here),*' televisions and computers, cell-phones and coffeemakers, automobiles and airplane travel, but could not ourselves fabricate
if our lives depended on it (this is the ominous subtext of the future-asdesert film genre, like Road Warrior or Mad Max). Assuming as we do
that someone else makes the tool, or wntes the code for our app idea, i.e.,
assuming that some factory actually deploys the technology, the gadgets
are what it is all about.
Thus critics object that, like Kurzweil, de Grey does not seem to mind
too much that the technology supposed by the theorizing (this would be de
Grey’s theorizing) ■ or futuristic speculation (this would be Kurzweil
picking up after Walt Disney left off and telling us what life will be like in
2025 or 2045) does not ‘exist’ as yet. Thus these are cheap ontic
objections. All that, so we suppose, like space flight and jetpacks will
come. And as if on cue. Virgin Airlines is currently selling tickets for
space flight for civilians (we are still waiting for the jetpacks). As iPhone
commercials insist on proclaiming, always without needing to ask what we
might have in mind (doesn’t matter): there’s an app for that (or we just
know there will be).

Sorgner as Educator: Transhumanism as the New
‘Future’ of our Educational Institutions

112

113

Sorgner seems to assume this same chirpily upbeat, technological
focus: the transhuman is the human plus (whatever) technological
enhancement. As a specific, Sorger attends to the issue of Nietzsche and
evolution, an issue that is itself far from straightforward (most readings of
Nietzsche and evolution depend upon a fairly limited understanding of
both Darwin and Nietzsche’s ovra understanding of Darwin).*^
We can hardly raise all the relevant questions that remain to be
explored on the (very, very) complicated theme of Nietzsche and Darwin,
but the key issue seems to be the (may we say mildly Lamarkian?) parallel
Sorgner constructs between education and genetic enhancement. As
Sorgner contends, education and genetic enhancement are “structurally
analogous procedures.”**
But, Lamarck to one side, it is worth asking what Sorgner means by
“education”? Does Sorgner understand this in the traditional sense of
Bildung or as what counts for the French SiS formation and where we may
speak of either in terms of what Nietzsche also called getting oneself a
culture, that is: personal and intellectual cultivation?
Or and now apart from these traditional meanings, will an “education”
correspond to nothing more than the business (emphasis on the economic
or cost-based affair) of acquiring and conferring, i.e., obtaining and selling
degrees and certificates — indeed and just as Sorgner suggests, all like
such modules, courses, degrees, parallel to many add-ons and upgrades,
like iPhone or android apps and the enormous market that there is for cell
phone accessories which same pale in comparison to the market for iPad
accessories, Apple and otherwise? And yet, it may be that this surface
parallel calls for a bit more reflection, especially with regard to Nietzsche
who himself reflected quite a bit on educational institutions as well as the
idea of education — even if we begin with his very paradoxical, very
provocative claim: “There are no educators'' [& gibt keine Erzieher] (HH
II, The Wanderer and his Shadow § 267).
What is certain is that many of us even within the academy do tend to
suppose that education is just and only the acquisition of such degrees,
especially at the graduate but also at the undergraduate level, and
especially as evident in the current debate in England and mainland
Europe on the virtues of the privatization of the university — a debate
which manages to overlook any review of the actual practice of the same
as this can be found in the US.*'' No need for factual feedback to sully our
models, as Orrin Pilkey, a very practical or applied or hands-on coastal
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Sorgner as Educator: Transhumanism as the New
‘Future’ of our Educational Institutions
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Sorgner seems to assume this same chirpily upbeat, technological
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scientist has argued with stunning consequentiality when it comes to beach
erosion and the public costs of “maintaining” the same and with very
specific meteorological applicability to the debates on global warming. •
I.e., no empiricism, please: we’re idealists.
Nietzsche’s own reflections on what is needed for an “education” as
such are quite formidable ■— even as his own education was an
extraordinary one. Thus we betray something of the limitations of our own
formation whenever we as scholars or commentators find oiuselves
insisting that Nietzsche took or borrowed his ideas from other thinkers —
ranging from Pascal and Spinoza or else Spir and Lange or Emerson, or
Gerber, or Stimer or ultimately and of course, from Wagner himself
(especially for the Wagnerians for whom no limit to the master’s ovm
cultural prowess can be imagined). I am not saying that Nietzsche was not
familiar with these thinkers: I am saying that an education is this
familiarity and much, much more. Thus although it is amusing to note that
the identity of the supposed origination of (the so-called ‘sources’ for)
Nietzsche’s ideas just happens to change in the scholarly literature over
time (and not less with the mood and, nota bene\, educational formation of
his commentators), it is also noteworthy that the very same set of
assumptions applies (negatively speaking) for those who are fond of
insisting that Nietzsche could never have read Kant (just to pick one
example, contentious given the influence of Kant on the 19th century, an
influence we fail to see in the 20th as in the 21st century, at least so far).
The idea that an education, the getting of or the having of one, is a
simple affair, and thus that the parallel idea of an upgrade to the morethan-human, that is now: the trans-human, would simply be like taking a
course or like signing up for an instructive module, supposes that one
pretend (as transhumanists do like to pretend) that one can/should set aside
questions of cultural inequalities, differences in wealth, “class” differences
and so on. In this {an sich inherently optimistic when it is not calculating
when it is not deliberately mendacious) regard, the transhumanist
movement may be revealed as a humanism, here using the term as JeanPaul Sartre once spoke of Existentialism as a Humanism.^^ Hence and at
least in principle, human enhancement may be regarded, if only for the
sake of argument, as corresponding to “enhancement for all,” like “micro
chips for all,” or “airport security searches for all.”
Ultimately, as Leibniz might help to remind us, such a broad extension
would lead to a society not of “enhanced” but and much rather of leveled
or flattened out humanity. Nor is this all-too surprising where the ideal of
humanism in question mirrors contemporary consumer society, viewed
firom the corporate side of the equation. In the commercial world view of

the corporate mindset, everyone ought to have (that means ought to buy)
an iPhone, iPad, Mac computer/laptop/airbook, heck everyone should have
ALL the stuff in the Apple store, etc. Beyond iPads or iPhones (and for the
sake of argument, android smart phones running android or related
programs may be counted as iPhones we can also add in other desirable
items or array , of items (flat screen tv, luxury car, new kitchen appliances,
‘smart’ houses — although these last, long insisted upon by technology
enthusiasts for the last half centmy under a variety of names, have yet to
catch on... and so on).
Sorgner argues that Nietzsche would back this enhanced or
“accessory” life, as the transhiunanist life for all and sundry. But,
Nietzsche also sidesteps this same advocacy. Hence although I believe that
we may read Nietzsche as advocating Sorgner’s transhumanism when
Nietzsche writes of a lesson that Nietzsche argues is one that may be
drawn fi-om the mirror of nature — “the only thing that matters is the
superior individual exemplar, the more unusual, more powerful, more
complex, more Ihiitful exemplar,” (SE §6) — as this is a point Nietzsche
seems to intensify, as virtually transhumanist as Sorgner or anyone
pleases, Nietzsche continues to emphasize that “the goal of any species’
evolution is the point at which it reaches its limit and begins the transition
to a higher species.” (Ibid.)
The problem here is the problem with any of Nietzsche’s texts: like
Proteus, Nietzsche’s words turn in our hands. Thus Nietzsche turns,
emphasizing with respect to that same evolution that “its goal is precisely
those seemingly scattered and random existences that arise here and there
under favotable conditions.” (Ibid.) The point to be taken is posed against,
as Nietzsche puts it at this juncture: “Mr. Commonman.” (Ibid.)
What is at issue for what we might regard as Nietzsche’s own brand of
transhumanism, if we may so speak of the self-overcoming that is the
transition to the overhuman, the post-human, is not only that it is no kind
of utilitarianism but also that it is also no kind of humanism, other than
that served, this would be nothing other than Nietzsche’s “future
humaneness” (GS §337), this would be what I have elsewhere described
and analyzed as the “bravest democratic fugue”^’ ever written, by
Nietzsche or anyone else (forgive me, Wagnerians of the world). Thus I
argue that Nietzsche’s “genius of the heart” (BGE §295) commimicates an
uncanny, shattering, ultimately unsettling, disquieting and quieting
“fanfare” for the common man. To this extent, the genius Nietzsche’s pied
piper comes to teach is not the transmogrified, new and improved
humanism of transhumanism but and much rather and this is related to his
Zarathustrian teaching of the over-human, beyond the self-satisfactions of
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the self (this is the reference to Lucian’s parodic hyperanthropos) and just
to the extent that such a post-humanism turns out to be all about going
beyond oneself. That anti-self-satisfied dimension is the heart of, the art of
acquiring nothing less than a culture in place of the self-absorptions of the
ego, the dear little self. But this is to say that it is not a religious, JudeoChristian kind of altruism, redeemable in trade for more or longer life,
even unto infinity and it is not a humanism. Hence Nietzsche excludes the
kind of a transhumanism Sorgner speaks of, because and qua
“enhancement,” transhumanism is not at all about self-overcoming but is
very much about self-preservation, self-assertion, self-advancement.
As an overcoming of rather than an enhancing of the human (or
perhaps better said, of the all-too-human), the meaning of Nietzsche’s
over-human turns out to be the meaning not of the human but of the earth.
In part, this is the essence of, this is the meaning of Pindar’s word to the
seldom-encountered, to the rare as Nietzsche quotes this throughout his
own life: become the one you are. In Nietzsche’s early meditation on
Schopenhauer as Educator, as referred to above, Nietzsche explains the
point to our Mr. Commonman by asking him to reflect on how his life can
have meaning or value at all only to answer in what seems to be Sorgner’s
spirit, appealing to a perfectly upgradable, trans-humanist project: “Surely
only by living for the benefit of the rarest and most valuable exemplars,
not for the benefit of the majority, that is, for the benefit of those who,
taken as individuals, are the least valuable species.” (SE §6)
The implicit elitism here cannot but alienate many of Nietzsche’s
readers. Nor is this particular kind of elitism incidental: for Nietzsche
insists on it again and again. Indeed his project from the start to the end of
his creative life was nothing other than the production of a higher culture
in broad terms and on the individual level of genius, whereby Nietzsche
supposed the first to require the second, i.e., that the restoration on the
level of culture of a once and yet higher culture called for that same rare
genius. And Nietzsche took care to emphasize and to reflect upon the
significance of that same rarity. For Nietzsche, and this is perhaps his
greatest distance from the transhumanist movement, this particular rarity
will not be an upgrade money can buy. The object of such design, on
Nietzsche’s account, are the values themselves as Nietzsche regarded such
values, empirically enough, as values of middle-rank: mediocrity.
Here related to elitism would seem to be the ‘spectre’ which we may
also and very politely call “the” problem of eugenics.^® But, as Sorgner
emphasizes (and as Bostrom also argues/® it won’t be Nazi eugenics, but
and much rather (but how different this is?) a liberal eugenics that one
might support. The difference is that Bostrom is anxious to limit

associations with Nietzsche in order to lend coherence to a rhetorical
assertion that transhuman value judgments would not necessarily go along
with the spectacle of posthumans in contest with humans, and thereby
suggesting that negative scenarios would be unlikely and hence need not
be unduly feared. Thus Sorgner could say that there is nothing problematic
in comparing one scholar’s masters from Cambridge with his masters from
Durham, or another scholar’s Oxford PhD with one from Jena. Except, of
course for an employer in the all-too status conscious world of university
philosophy.-This is just what Bourdieu called cultural capital and it can be
argued that such differences make no real difference (this egalitarian
presumption was what Bourdieu began with, was not, as it turned out,
vindicated by Bourdieu’s research).®® Nor is it an accident that the right
kind of educational pedigree confers what Bourdieu calls “cultural
nobility.” This is the Harvard or Oxford or Cambridge effect.®'
Thus the conviction that it would not matter too much if some had
transhuman upgrades and some did not, is like the conviction that it does
not matter that one person has a degree from wherever imiversity and
another person has a degree from the same Harvard that was certainly if
perhaps only serendipitously happy to publish Bourdieu’s Distinction.
Thus the distinction between Nazi eugenics and liberal eugenics surely
matters in some sense but how would that difference make a difference to
those who might be considered ‘merely’ human as opposed to the new
transhuman, and assuming the progress we already know from consumer
models for such things, those considered no more than the original
transhuman versus the latest model of the same. I am talking about the
putative subhuman, say, by comparison with the putative overhuman. This
is the original iPhone vs. the currently current model, iPhone 6S or and
indeed and this would be my point vs. the awaited iPhone SE (or X or
whatever) version, etc.
Here it is relevant to note that in the literature, rather like the not-quitereally-there-yet qualities of post-op transmen and transwomen, the
transhuman is the transitional human: on the way to a perfect model that
the marketing department, again very like the iPhone, Kurzweil’s favorite
example for being (aheady) technologically enhanced, already has in
planning, but has yet to “release.” The tension this produces is fantastic
because it is of a piece with marketing. One wants the newest iPhone, with
just those features it happens to have; at the same time one wants to wait
for the next iPhone, because there is no way to know, with perfect
certainty, for sure, for sure, if the newest gadget has all the promised
qualities advertised as desirable, qualities the one around the comer might
have. There are upgrades and then there are upgrades and the consumer
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has learned that there is no difference in cost only in release time: all new
phone versions are the same, cost-wise, on balance, what differs is the
quality of the upgrade between differing instaurations. ^
Withal, it takes Sorgner nine good steps in order to pose the financial
(in a Marxian framework this is also a “class”) question. I have already
observed that this question always attends the supposed coming
technological singularity. Indeed, while one may argue that if the supposed
ideal behind the transhumanist movement is to create a better world for
all,“ anything that involves technology also involves not randomness and
not luck so much as money.
This is, of coixrse, the old story of those who have and those who have
not. This too would fit, rather nicely, Sorgner’s point with respect to the
structural analogies to be had between education and genetic enhancement.
And in every version of the world as we know it, present and past, only
those with class privilege (call this money, call this being part of the right
group of people) have access to the ultimate advantages of education. Thus
it is not for nothing that the late (and not accidently saintly) Ivan Illich
took care to remind us of what most academics, inured to the school
system as they are, never point out: school educates us to have very
specific, i.e., very elite tastes in music, food, travel, consumption.®'* Hence,
following Sorgner’s parallel between education and transhumanism for the
sake of argument here, in the transhumanist world as Sorgner envisions it
along with Kurzweil and de Gfrey as the world to come (this would be the
post BP old-spill world to go with the ongoing old [but not reported]
coupled with the new [but not reported] spills or leaks in the Gulf of
Mexico, post-earthquake world in Japan, here with the same caveats, and
the same lack of news reports on the same ongoing consequences of
radiation fallout), in this new world, only those with ample resources
(financial and otherwise) will have access to transhuman enhancements,
just as only those with access to advanced medical care can afford the
implants that can keep a failing heart going — and this is true today as
well and on any level of technology, be it a heart transplant, a pacemaker
or even a shunt. Add to that the cost of those life-style changes (drugs,
foodstuffs, leisure or care) required in order to provide the necessary
supports needed for life with a heart transplant, pacemaker, etc. And now
we are back to the cost of the future transhuman via xenotransplants to be
harvested from the pig-human chimeras now in production for those with

capitalism advances culture, that enhancing the wealth of the wealthy, that
enhancing the well-being of the wealthy is ‘somehow’ in the interest of
everyone. But as Nietzsche points out of the fantasy of an eternal reward,
one has to wait a long time for the reward. Call it trickle-down economics,
or call it whatever you like, this is the economics of the scratch-card
lottery and it is a fantasy.
Nevertheless and beyond such phantasms as palliative stories favored
by the wealthy and by those who wish to be like them, there is a key
difference between the ideal of education Sorgner adduces and access to
the kind of thing that has investors speculating on ‘leadership’ (always
another word for corporate interests) in Kurzweil’s Singularity University.®®
For education can be had, education does exist, and there are better and
worse articulations of the same and it is also true that some people have a
better education than others not just because of their own aptness, their
intrinsic ability but and just because their training was itself the result of
greater reflection, care, design, paideia.^ As Nietzsche reminds us from
the very start of his Schopenhauer as Educator, ultimately the individual
is responsible. But what Nietzsche means by an education is not what the
university educator means by it and it is not is not on at either Singularity
University or Harvard.®’
As A1 Lingis argues, as Ivan Illich had argued before him, the sick ■
individual must eschew the position of patient: there is a moral imperative
to health, i.e., one must take responsibility for one’s own health. In the
same way,' one must take responsibility for and that is to say one must
choose or ‘ select, elect or design one’s own education, one’s own
educators.®* And it is this that Nietzsche means when he says as already
cited: “there are no educators.”
In every case, as Nietzsche already saw in his own reflections on what
he called very specifically “The Future of our Educational Institutions,”
the task of getting oneself an education, getting oneself an educator, falls
to the individual. Thus if we cannot answer Illich’s charges that our ideal
of education so far from ‘enhancing’ society and so far from “enhancing”
the individual within that society (this is Sorgner’s model) perpetuates a
particular and not accidentally capitalist structure, inculcating (as Illich
emphasized and as Adorno would emphasize and as Marcuse would
emphasize) fhe very same point Nietzsche had in mind with his own
utterly non-socialist challenge to Mr. Commonman, what we can note is
that so very far from culture, we find only identical consumer tastes for
what are only identical consumer goods in a world of limited resources, a
world already set to serve the profit of increasingly few. Education, to
paraphrase Nietzsche, likewise.
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means.
It is popular to advert to the most empirically (if one wishes to
consider the facts) disproven vision of economics, the economic ideal that
nevertheless and still dominates most markets, namely the idea that
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But this more critical point, though I think it needs to be made, is less
significant than the insight I share, I think, with Illich and with Sorgner:
there is the formation of skill or training and this can, as Sorgner rightly
argues, avail us nothing less remarkable than what Nietzsche calls a
second nature. Thereby the individual is empowered to climb, as Nietzsche
argues, up to his or her higher, second self by means of these, one’s
educators.®®
This second self might count as the transhuman but this is not usually
what we mean by it. And Kurzweil, like most rich men, simply would
rather not give up the riches of his life, not now, not ever. The
technological singularity is all about not dying. Transhumanism is about
not dying. Hence when we argue on behalf of transhumanism we argue as
very dedicated devotees of a cargo cult that has yet to deliver the goods —
which is why it is a cult. Just because, as the old New York City Jewish
joke (Woody Allen tells this joke in Hannah and Her Sisters) argues on
behalf of the neurosis of a relative who thinks he is a chicken: “we need
the eggs.” We need, we want what transhumanism promises. This cargo
cult faith goes together with a conviction that that the only thing that holds
science back from this windfall of technological add-ons and upgrades is
some ethical aversion to, say, stem cell research, so we argue for the
“value” of transhumanism, just to quell such objections.’®
And yet and at the current time, the vaunted enhancements of
transhumanism are still so many motes in the eye of a technological
demon yet to be bom. And by fixing our sights on these possibilities, these
potential benefits, these promised promises, we overlook the more urgent
problems all around us and we pass over the experience that is or should
be common to us, the experience of technologies gone wrong, of
imanticipated side-effects of the kind one can never anticipate apart firom
the instruction of practice.
What fascinates us here is pure promise, sheer potential. Although at
the moment of this writing, we can do none of this, we are preoccupied
with the sheer idea of transhumanism: we are so tired of the merely
human, the human, all too human that we want transhumanism. And
Nietzsche must be its prophet. But this is not new, as Bostrom reminds us,
tracing the idea and the ideal back to Gilgamesh and his search for a cure
for his friend Enkidu, like Kurzweil’s putative search for what would have
cured, not himself, but his father. Thus we have been preocuuped with the
idea of creating ourselves, in our own image, for centuries, for millennia,
recall Talos, the man of bronze, or else the Golem, the being made fi'om
clay, as Genesis tells us we are made in the image of deity, or else and as
we confidently read Plato’s noble lie, we imagine ourselves secretly

formed in our core on the basis of essence of gold of silver of brass.
Today, perhaps we think of a combination of plastic and metal, opting for
the simulacrum of the human or dispense with all of that for the dream
consciousness that would be digitally enhanced humanity, now reduced to
nothing but digital reverberations: coded humanity, the program, the
circuit, the network.
For as long as we have been a conversation on this question of being
hmnan, our thoughts are there in being ourselves our own originators. So
what, we say, that we are not nearly so near to this consummation as all
our intellectual efforts on this theme might make us suppose? Are we not
already transhuman because, after all, some of us see by means of contact
lenses? Are we not, all of us, already transhuman because a chip
embedded in one paralyzed woman’s brain functions to allow the most
minimal of effects? Intriguingly we argue this one-way influence. Do such
achievements count as an evolution to a ‘higher’ (because techno-enhanced)
species? Are we not already transhuman because of pacemakers, artificial
limbs and joints, crutches and wheelchairs?
We do .'make such’ claims, note only the way we talk about the
wounded American soldiers and contractors back from Iraq and back from
Afghanistan. Beyond these our ongoing US wars, each one of which we
may hope is only temporary but each one of which has since proven itself
to be astonishingly durable, we also have long practice making trans
animals and we do this for every peaceful or market-driven reason—-which
does not mean that it is not, as Nietzsche would say, thoroughly soaked in
blood, and for long time. We breed and raise animals in order to sell them
more efficiently but also in order to experiment on them trying out
medical, therapeutic uses for animal parts (this will also be a kind of
transhumtoism) all already in place for diabetics and heart surgery, all
with little written about this, all with as little supervision as possible (and
biological • scientists treat the concerns of the public ‘ as so much
interference, as anti-science, and thus devote pages of peer-reviewed
articles to reviewing means that might be deployed to ‘educate’ the public
such that it would not oppose their expert-sanctioned policies of species
extirpation, as this serves the advantages of exploiting animal parts),”
sacrificed to join flesh and machine. And then there is the fact that we are
already transhuman inasmuch as we eat cloned beef in addition to beef
laced with antibiotics and steroids to permit quick growth, for a quick sale
and the abysmal everyday holocaust that is the path to industrial scale
slaughter. We are what we eat. With regard to bodyparts — organic
transplants or technological replacements — we note that obstacles seem
to remain, but the technology seems likely to be solved, and in case not.
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we hope to overcome the immune limitations we currently face by
sidestepping the same: this is the allure of stem-cell technology just in that
such technology promises to allow us to do the straightforward transplants
that we currently cannot manage without staggering requirements for
immune-suppressors. So too, the point of cloning: not to reproduce Fluffy
(once again, the cloned Fluffy II never looks like the original Fluffy save
by the old fashioned breeder’s means of taking the best of a horrifying
number of clones [multiple pregnancies/whelps] coupled with desire and a
pet owner’s memory deficits)’^ and much rather to “grow” bio-identical
body parts that mi^t not look the same, but should, if we are lucky,
permit us to switch out body parts. (And only science fiction horror
enthusiasts, in fiction and film, bother to reflect on the life of the clone that
happens to bear those replacement parts for us.)
We need the transhuman just because the transhuman would have, so
we imagine, replaceable, up-gradeable parts. This is our cargo-cult of life
and death and like the man who visits a psychiatrist on behalf of his
brother in Woody Allen’s joke, we need, we want the eggs.
We want to be anything but human. We want, as Gunther Anders
already argued in his 1956 The Obsolesence of Humanity, to overcome our
“promethean shame” and to be like our precisely manufactured objects in
all their precision, all their durability, all their replaceability. We wish to
be objects with exchangeable parts, infinitely upgradable, as science
fiction robot stories have long explored these possibilities. Bad heart? Get
a replacement. Bad eyes, replace them with optical sensors, see the way
Robocop sees — i.e., in the dark, through walls, complete with grids and
autofocus—^upgrade to Cyborg vision. Bad spirit, that is to say, afflicted
with the ‘disease’ du jour, namely “depression”?^^ There are a bunch of
pills to help with that. But what we want, at least we think this, is to live
forever.

mediocre. And what dominates in the run of the mill is the slavely moral,
which is the only morality that remains in any conflict. This is
Ressentiment as Nietzsche famously characterizes as the ascetic ideal. And
the ideal of the ascetic is fundamentally anti-life. The ascetic ideal, let us
recall, is anti-life in that it opposes everything that life involves and seeks
an improvement on that, even if, rmtil now, it has supposed that it would
need to live, these are Nietzsche’s words, “a very long time” in order to
attain just that compensation, which has rmtil now been promised after
death and in eternity.
Transhumanism is thus the latest and maybe not even the best (we
should probably wait for the next model) instantiation of the ascetic ideal.
One wants life but one does not want life as it is, with all its trouble and
mess, with all its banality and its limitations. Instead one wants videogame style life, one wants movie or television life: without suffering,
without illness, without permanent death (save of the redeemable,
corrigible, resettable kind), and although one wants sex, one might well be
inclined to exclude birth, generating children on demand. Maybe.
If we become the machine we do not, as in the Christian promise of
reincarnation, get our obsolescence-prone bodies back? Have we not
thereby perfected the body, as the last men would say, blinking, as
Nietzsche tells us, as they say so. One might have taken that to mean that
the last men do not mean what they say, or that they do not rmderstand or
that they merely guess at what they say. Maybe their blinking indicates
only a temporary loss of power in the electrical grid. What is certain is
that one motivation for the transhuman ideal would be formd in its
capacity to take us beyond the need to recharge our devices, the need to
ensure that the power supply remains unbroken. And so we need Iraq,
Afghanistan, Libya, Iran, etc.
In all this, the ethical question takes a back seat to the practical.
Because we caimot quite effect the transhuman beyond the cheaper and
fairly ontic details of contact lenses already mentioned and replacement
knees and hips, we nonetheless spend an inordinate amount of time
debating the value of doing the things we caimot do at levels well beyond
our actual technical grasp. What matters is that and in our mind’s eye, we
are already there. In fact, we have been there in this mind’s eye since
before I was bom.
No problem say those who argue, with Kurzweil at the forefront, that
the technological singularity is one that accelerates exponentially, taking
Moore’s Law not as a statistical generalization thus far and as applied to
chips but as if it were a cosmic law of nature applicable to everything

122

Nietzsche and Humanism
I have said that Nietzsche’s philosophy is not a humanism. Thus it is
not for nothing that he declares that humanity is something that should be
overcome. For Nietzsche, the human being is the ‘skin- disease’ of the
earth not because humanity is somehow an awfiil mistake of creation but
because in the human everything base tends to thrive while everything
higher tends to perish. This we may call Nietzsche’s Schopenhauerianism.
And as Nietzsche observes — contra both Hegel and Darwin, this is the
point of his reflection on evolution as noted above — it is not the strong
who survive or have dominion but the mediocre, the incurably, perpetually
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technological/'' whereby the apparent absence of signs of such consummate
final evolution is utterly consistent with the process.
But some worry that such transhuman elements as there will be will
not be likely to be the legacy of all. And with Nietzsche, or more
accurately with Ayn Rand, we might here ask why such elements should
be enhancements for all? If hiunans will power, they will advancement,
but if they will advancement, they will advancement as an advantage over
all others.
What is the point of being transhuman if you are not thereby advanced
to a position closer to the superior individual by contrast with dthers and
for the sake of which, as Nietzsche suggests, everything in you should be
directed?
As with education, transhumanism, just assuming all the obstacles
noted can be overcome, cannot but be for those of us who have the means
to assure our personal evolution, qua transhuman, and it is here that the
parallel to education as we know it, in terms of human excellences, as in
exemplars, as in habit, comes to an end. If one promises that, like cell
phones, costs for transhuman enhancements will ‘come down’ one
participates in the lies of the privileged. Nor does everyone have a cell
phone, nor has poverty been abolished even when it comes to bread and
water promises to be the battle of the current century at least. The
promised transformation of the human is not to be modeled on the
advantages of youth and health or the competitive edge of learning not so
much because there will likely be a financial bar to accessibility (although
there surely will be that) but far more because it is also designed to be a
departure from the lived, flesh and blood body. And that is nothing but the
ascetic ideal again: anti-life, again. As Nietzsche once remarked, no
sooner have we overcome the true world, than we find we have also
surpassed the apparent one.
Here Sorgner might do well to return to his initial engagement with
Bostrom. For Bostrom’s concerns, mapped out with all the care that befits
someone who took his degree at the London School of Economics (ah, a
cultural noble!) is what he calls, on the most physically metaphysical level
one might suppose, existential risk.^^ And risk is the heart of the point of
existentialism as it mattered in its origins, not in Denmark but in Germany
and above all in France, with the thought of death and not only of god’s
abandonment all around one. I am speaking of Jaspers, of Bataille, Sartre,
Camus.
Thus we overcome both body and soul.
This is evidence of the animus philosophy (and this includes science)
seems to have contra life. Hence we recall Nietzsche’s arguments on

philosophy as anti-life. And here again I agree with Gunther Anders, the
very heretical critical theorist who was also at the same time that he was
anti-Adorno, also an anti-Heideggerian (whereby, bien entendu, to be antianything always also includes what is opposed).
Anders had argued that if we are ‘ashamed,’ appalled, by our humanity
it is because we find it deficient, and thus we mean to correct it.
Transhumanism would only be the latest word for what Anders diagnosed:
a precipitate conviction of a consumerist capitalist world-ethos. The
obsolescence of the human is part and parcel of the obsolescence of
everything else from music and film in the culture industry to the media
we ‘consume’ rather than ‘enjoy.’
For my part, I still hear Nietzsche’s reflection at the end of The Gay
Science section entitled. The Thought of Death. “It makes me happy that
men' do not want at all to think the thought of death! I should like very
much to do something that would make the thought of life even a hundred
times more appealing to them.” (GS §278)
Thus when we later read (towards the end of this the first edition of the
Gay Science, Nietzsche will take until 1887 to finish the second and final
edition) of what Nietzsche speaks of as the “‘humaneness’ of the future,” I
take the idea of humaneness here very much as I believe Sorgner would, as
the happiness of a single feeling, not an immortality (the entire passage is
shot tlnough with the need to think mortality somehow, like the sun at
evening) as such but exactly as one “whose horizon encompasses
thousands of years past and future,” all eontained “in a single soul and a
single feeling, the happiness of a god, full of power and love, full of tears
and laughter.” (GS §337)
Shall we call this “enhancement”? Is this single soul with its singular
single feeling, denominated by Nietzsche as the “happiness of a god,” the
transhuman? I do not think that Sorgner would find it difficult to argue
this. And why not? Can we not imagine such a being as an avatar in any of
the computer games one can play for fun (one’s own pleasure) and profit
(of course and always and even when the game has our own players’ input,
someone else’s profit).’®
For Nietzsche, joy is not in saving, keeping, or preserving life. Joy is
dispensation: the sun at evening as Nietzsche writes: blessing everything
with gold. The emphasis is not the gold we immediately seek to literalize.
Like Pindar who lyrically declared ‘water is best,’ the gold of the sun at
evening is gold on the water, as in the Venice Nietzsche liked to visit,
when afternoon turns to evening and “even the poorest fisherman rows
with golden oars.” (GS §337) Like the happiness of that ‘bright star,’ all
happiness is giving out, expression, gift. In question is less the issue of
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how one might overcome humanity (Nietzsche teaches that the human
being must go under) and thus it is less a call to live as a god lives: a
deathless life — the point is tied to Nietzsche’s melancholy (and Northern)
insight that all gods die — than and much rather the singularization of
recurrence in each event: “Do you desire this, once more and innumerable
times more?” (GS §341) If one might argue that this is compatible with the
transhuman as eternal circuit, eternal loop — it still leaves us where we
started.

altering change. It is relevant that this was no mere metaphor for Ulam who
worked on the Manhattan Project and designed what is usually regarded as the
foundation for current thermonuclear weapons. See Stanislaw Ulam’s memorial
essay, “John von Neumann, 1903-1957” (1958, 5).
11 Ibid. Vinge’s reference here is to Stent (1969).
12 Vinge (1993) lists among others: K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation, (1986);
Freeman Dyson, Infinite in All Directions (1988), Marvin Minsky, Society of Mind
(1985); Hans Moravec, Mind Children (1988), and so on.
13 Vinge (1993).
14 Vinge (1993). I discuss the science fantasy author, R. Scott Bakker’s rather
differently minded sensibility regarding some related themes in Babich (2015).
15 Bostrom (2003a).
16 Bostrom (2003a, 243).
17 Feyerabend(1978,90).
18 See the contributions to Melaihphy and Mellamphy (2016).
19 See Howard Caygill’s luminous 2009 essay: “Under the Epicurean Skies”
which Caygill situates via Usener but especially with reference to A.-J. Festugiere
(1946) as well as to be sure the indispensable Pierre Hadot (1995).
20 A useful discussion for those who favor, as most Anglophone readers do,
Foucault, Agamben, Badiou, etc., is Jonathan Goldberg’s, “Turning toward the
World: Lucretius, in Theory,” chapter two of Goldberg (2009, 31-63).
21 Anonymity or net-privacy turns out to be less about surfing pom sites than it is
about the content that becomes the product that is deep date, i.e., the venality of
Microsoft and Sony and Apple who wish to be secure (as they already know
everything you look at) their right to charge you for it, thus getting their cut from easy
piece of software you use, anytime you use it, as of anything you look at, download, or
share online each and every time you look at it, download, share it.
22 Sorgner (2009, 29).
23 Sorgnec’s own reference here is to Habermas (2001, 43).
24 For Habermas’s anxiety concerning the danger of Nietzsche’s thinking,
alternately characterized as “infectious” or contagious, see the contributions
(including a translation of Habermas’s own 1968 essay on Nietzsche’s
epistemology), to Babich (Ed.) (2004).
25 Sorgner cites Nicklas Bostrom (2005b, 1). Bostrom, whose work is already
cited above, teaches philosophy at Oxford University and is the Director of the
Future of Humanity Institute. He is also editor with Julian Savulescu of a 2009
book on Human Enhancement and takes the notion of the “post-human” condition
about as literally as one might wish. For one overview of transhumanism as a
concept see Agar (2007) as well as Bostrom (2003b). Note that discussion
continues to be heavily influenced by N. Katherine Hayles’s 1999 How We
Became Posthuman as well as and in addition to Turkle’s early work, Mark
Poster’s 1990 study: The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social
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for an important discussion of the aesthetics of gaming, Bateman (2011).
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formulaic science fiction novel, and more than one scholarly study. Thus, more
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uncritically but with just enou^ ambiguity to encourage the powers that be, see
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address: http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Global/Singularity/sing.html. Vinge remains
confident (personal communication) of his own contribution to the theme.
Bostrom’s essay privileges rather more, as is commonly done (common by
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contributions cites von Neumann on the imminent transience of our human interest
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29 Ibid., 35.
30 Ibid.
31
I hardly oppose the broadly metonymic to the literalist rendering of
posthumanism and I use the latter terminology in a related context with reference to
both Umberto Eco and Nietzsche in Babich (1990) and not less to render the
nuances of the concept ofNietzsche’s Ubermensch in Babich (1994, 12ff).
32 Sorgner (2009, 39).
33 Ibid., 40.
34 See Jaron Lanier’s 2010 You Are Not A Gadget. It is relevant to the present
context that in response to an email inquiry I sent regarding the argument I seek to
develop here, Lanier’s first response was the exclamation, “Yikes, Nietzsche
studies!” And “Yikes” is the sort of comment that obviously speaks volumes.
35 See Sloterdijk (1999) but see too Sloterdijk’s interview with Erik Alliez (2007).
36 See for a discussion of Sloterdijk related to these issues, Babich (2011b).
37 In: Alliez (2007, 319). Note that and inasmuch as Gunther was employed by
several US goverranent agencies, Gunther’s Das Bewusstsein der Maschinen (1957)
is at least accessible in part in English, e.g.— and note agmnthe science fiction locus
—■ in the pulp magazine, Startling Stories, Gunther (1953). Contemporary scholars
may find this reference of interest more because of a hoped for resonance, say with
Simondon, or owing to an interest in Ray Kurzweil’s mystical vision of technology
in Kurzweil (2006). A product in a consummate fashion of the last century, bom in
the same year’s but dying in the Orwellian year of 1984, Gunther, an
enthusiastically pro-American German could not have been less Orwellian is worth
our attention in any case as a useful guide to what might have been hoped for as a
result of possible logics in the wake of Godel’s challenge to the same and Godel
was interested in Gunther’s outline of non-Aristotelian logic (1959). But see too
Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2000).
38 Thus it is worth noting that Sloterdijk also discusses thinking on the philosophy
of technology in the today more esoteric than not philosophic writers on
technology, such as Rathaus, Freyer, Turel, JUnger, Dessauer, etc., in the latter
pages of Sloterdijk’s 1987 Critique of Cynical Reason,.
39 In: Alliez (2007, 318).
40 Warren McCulloch, is the author of Embodiments of Mind (1965). See for an
astonishing reading idealizing cybernetics, here qua proto-cognitive science, and
psychoanalysis, including a passing swipe at psychiatry (the latter as much for its
circularity as its cupidity), McCulloch’s The Past of a Delusion (1953). McCulloch
trained as a physician and studied psychoanalysis with Ferenczi, challenges
Freud’s unconscious in economic terms, rather as Adolf Griinbaum has sought to
do in related ventures in the Pittsburgh tradition of the philosophy of science.
Where McCulloch supposed that one needed to integrate new understandings into
the account of the mind, suggesting that one “contrast Freud’s delusion with the
sad humility of Sherrington, who though he knows more physiology of brains that
any other Englishman, admitted that for him in this world. Mind goes more ghostly
than a ghost.” (1953, 21-22), his real objection turned upon the foundation of what
he called Freud’s “delusion” (and thus the title of McCulloch’s essay), i.e.,
psychoanalysis: “One of the cornerstones of Freud’s delusions is that we forget no

single jot or tittle of what at any time has happened to us. By calculations that
began naively with the senior Oliver Wendell Holmes and are today best handled
by the physicist von Forster, man’s head would have to be about the size of a small
elephant to hold that much. His body could not eat enough to energize its mere
retention even if we suppose a single molecule of structuring protein would serve
as trace. Actually the mean half-life of a trace in human memory, and of a
molecule of protein, is only half a day. Some few per cent of engrams do survive,
presumably because we recreate the traces in our heads, but that is all fate leaves
us of our youth. Where written words remain to check our senile recollections they
often prove us wrong. We rewrite history, inventing the past so it conforms to
present needs. We forget, as our machines forget, because entropic processes
incessantly corrupt retention and transmission of all records and all signals. Partly
because all men, when pushed, fill in the gaps of memory, partly because hysterics
and neurotics generally are most suggestible, Freud’s so-called findings of repressed
unconscious stuff rest on confabulation, perhaps his patients; but where the free
associations and the dreams are both his own, there cannot be a question but that
Freud did the confabulating.” (Ibid., 23)
41 Vinge(1993).
42 Alliez (2007, 318).
43 Ibid., p. 324.
44 Latour (1991). Compare here with reference to Harry Potter and education my video
lecture “On Alan Rickman as Professor Severus Snape: The Actor as Exemplar”
“Getting to Hogwarts.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjqSW0rOKaw.
45 And Linux operating systems are not the answer because Word, which is
arguably the touchstone (no one can handle WordPerfect, which has given up and
become a Word impersonator as a consequence) is not the same as Open Office. In
fact. Word on a Mac and Word on a PC (I bristle at this because what are Macs if
they are PCs, Toasters? Hoverboards?) does not give one identical results,
although you need to look at the print results to note the difference (so make a PDF
and minimize it, it’ll still be there, but coherent unto the file you crafted without
the changes introduced by the new platform: WYSIWYG). So let’s all go blame
Microsoft but the problem is that hardware makes a difference. Your screen makes
a difference, your computer and software settings make a difference (whether known
to you or not) and now Google and Facebook and other bubble protocols to go with
your television programming also makes a difference.
46 I owe this reference to Tracy B. Strong who persisted in singing this song from
the 1963 musical Bye Bye Birdie for no apparent reason day and night. This is, of
course, an instantiation of the ‘Hallelujah Effect’ while I was writing this essay. And
repetition, any repetition, affords the same propaganda effect as a commercial. As
Adorno points out, in the realm of pop culture, be it Toscanini or jazz or any pop
radio song, liking is a matter of recognition.
47 There is a lot published on this, but see, e.g., Jonathan Franzen’s 2011 op-ed
piece, “Liking Is for Cowards. Go for What Hurts.”
48 Although de Grey does not have a post at Cambridge University and there was
a certain understated scandal associated with the implication that he did have one,
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had been watching the science fiction films of the 1950s or reading Fantastic

Stories.
50 But for a critical overview that also applies to KurzweiTs prediction of the
coming ‘technological singularity,’ see Richard A. L. Jones, a professor of physics
at Sheffield University, (2008) and (2004).
51 See, on toilets, Ivan Illich’s important 1985 study, H20 and the Waters of

Forgetfulness.
52 See for a (very) truncated account Babich (2014).
53 Sorgner (2010). Here cited from: http://jetpress.org/v21/sorgner.htm. See for
my own reading of education more broadly Babich (2014) as well as Babich
(2016a).
54 European advocates of such ideals of educational ‘excellence’ tend to focus on
Princeton, or Yale, or Harvard, somehow missing the hundreds of thousands and
even millions of tuition-driven, for-pay or profit institutions as these abound at every
level of post-secondary education in the United States. As for me. I’d compare
CUNY or SUNY or the University of California system to private schools, even top
tier schools, any day — if not of course when it comes to prestige as that is a market
and class affair, but indeed and when it comes to education. The more critical
point here is that European fantasies about private schools tend to suppose that all
private schools work like so-called ‘top-tier’ schools. Ivan Illich already put paid to
this assumption more broadly in his criticism of school as such. For references and
discussion, see, among the other essays which I recommend in the same respective book
collections, (Babich 2011b) as well as Babich (2009a).
55 See Orrin H. Pilkey and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis (2007) as well as, on the topic of
global climate change, Keith Pilkey and Orrin Pilkey (2011). And see Ohis very
practical, timely 2011 editorial: The road ahead on the Outer Banks,. I discuss
Pilkey’s analysis of modeling further in Babich (2010).
56 By contrast Heidegger’s “Humanismusbrief’ is written against such a
presupposition. See Sartre’s L'existentialism est un humanisme and compare the
two with Sloterdijk’s controversial Elmau lecture: Regeln fur den Menschenpark.
Some of this discussion draws upon points I make in Babich (2011c).
57 Babich (2006,166ff) as well as Babich (201 la, 124ff).
58 See for a current overview and discussion. Sparrow (2011).
59 See, for example, Bostrom (2003a).
60 Bourdieu (1984).
61 All scholars hailing from schools left out (present author included) may weep on
cue.
62 Think old model IPhones, available for next to nothing (and, of course, a contract).
Gotcha. And that is a gotcha when the decidedly desirable iPhone7 is the current
model but customers are already anticipating the iPhone8 ...
63 Many commentators have explored the question of what Nietzsche thinks to
animate the conventional dream of such a better world, at least on the surface of it.
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in his discussion of the same in Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of

Morals, and Twilight of the Idols.
64 See, again, for context and further references here, my discussion of Illich’s

Deschooling Society in Babich (2011b). I add a discussion of Illich’s critique of
institutions in Babich (2017).
65 See, for example, http://singularityu.org/.
66 See the initial sections of Babich (2009b) and Babich (2009c).
67 I have elsewhere noted that university level philosophers rarely give significant
thought to decisions of curriculum (in my own department it is relegated to
committee which is to say that is it evaded) and that this is regrettable.
68 This was the theme of A1 Lingis’ plenary address at the conclusion of the 50th
Anniversaiy meeting of SPEP in Philadelphia, Oct. 22, 2011.
69 Here I recommend the wide range of essays contributed to Fairfield (Ed.)
(2011).
70 As if there were not advanced research cultures already extant that had no such
‘ethical’ restrictions at all. As if the only values in the world were Western values.
71 The numbers in question are systematically, because statistically, overstated for
the sake of wildlife policy which always involves a recommendation and policy of
extermination. See for a recent account, with unvarying literature. Loss, Will &
Marra (2013). These accounts are well-aware of the dangers of criticism. See
Dauphine and Cooper (2009). The authors reflect that “lethal control methods are
increasingly the targets of negative campaigns by many animal rights and welfare
groups and special interest groups, often with disastrous results for the conservation
of native wildlife” (ibid., 211). By “lethal control” is meant the killing of cats,
which of course has ‘disastrous results’ for those feral groups. One species for the
sake of a preferred other. In addition there is the artifice of the construct of what
counts as wildlife, as native, and so on. The debate is part of a larger one on
conservation in general and “managed care” of the environment which of course
turns the environment only and solely into what we, or zoo or wildlife
‘management’ experts say that it is. And in turn this is part of the complex issue of
public vs. expert authority in policy matters. See for a discussion, Kleinman’s 2003
Impure Cultures, specifically addressed to the issue of the relation of business or
capital interests and seience in addition to Kleinman (2005) as well as with respect to
biotech, co-authored with Kleinman, Steven P. Valias (2008). Kleinman is among the
more measured of these discussions but see too Daniel S. Greenberg’s many
books, especially (1968) and (2008). And note here that, as in many cases where
an author issues so very many books on a single theme, there is a distinct lack of
reception.
72 The problem which cloning enthusiasts seeking to promote their research
endeavors seem to have overlooked when talking to journalists about likely perks of
the procedure is that the expression of genetic traits is already determined by the
cortex of the ovum. Without the specific egg, the one and only one that led to you
all your physical traits, your clone will not look like you. And Fluffy’s clone will not
even have the same markings. For those who mourn their lost pet, look for a similar
looking kitten or puppy or adult dog or cat or give a brand new pet, with a whole
other appearance, a chance to live. To date, so called “animal shelters” exist not to
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‘shelter,’ to care, to feed, to protect the lives of animals but as holding institutions
for the purpose of killing them.
73 No one to date has answered the critical challenges of Thomas Szasz (1974) or
(1978) or (1994). See too Szasz’ study of Karl Kraus and the Soul-Doctors, Szasz,
(1976).
74 Moore’s law was formulated by Gordon Moore, cofounder of Intel, and predicts
that the number of transistors that can be placed on chip will double every two
years. With modifications and extensions, the “law” has been extended.
Intriguingly, Paolo Garginl, director of technology strategy at Intel had already
pointed to a limit. Cf Zhirnov et al. (2003) and (2008). Moore himself, intriguingly,
does not share Kurzweil’s optimism, and predicts that the “rapture” will take place:
“Never.” See sidebar on the last page of Jones’ 2008 article, “Rupturing The
Nanotech Rapture” cited above.
75 See for a discussion of our tendency to get in the way of any estimation of
future risks Cirkovid, et al. (with Bostrom), (2010) as well as Bostrom’s (2009).
76 Games are not played for free, computers are not free, nor is access to the internet
free and so on, multiply that anyway one likes if one cares to “upgrade.” And the
newer models for licensing software take such costs still further (plus costs across
platforms, ‘cloud’ computing, the need to have a desktop and a laptop (or at least
one or the other), and an iPad and a cell phone entail proliferation of gadgets to do
the same thing, differently, with payments to different entities). Cheap, ontic
details turn out to be less than ‘cheap.’ And here the concern goes a good deal
beyond matters of access or supposed ‘affordability.’

Chapter Nine
ZARATHUSTRA 2.0 AND BEYOND:
Further Remarks on the Complex
Relationship between Nietzsche
AND Transhumanism
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner

After the intense debate concerning the relationship between Nietzsche,
European Posthumanisms and Transhumanism, which has taken place in
three issues of the Journal of Evolution and Technology (Vol. 20, issue 1;
Vol. 21, issues 1 and 2), and in this issue of “The Agonist”, the exchange
has entered the realm of Nietzsche scholarship. I regard this as an
important step given the relevance of the questions which have been raised
by transhumanists. Due to the close structural similarity between
Nietzsche’s philosophy and many transhumanists’ reflections, for which I
argued at least, an exchange between the two discourses can be of great
use for scholars of both topics. As Nietzsche scholarship is related to the
tradition of continental philosophy and transhumanists’ reflections are
most closely connected to analytical ethics exchanges and the AngloAmerican Utilitarian (Mill) and evolutionary theory (Darwin) tradition,
experts of both disciplines do not usually meet and argue with one another.
I hope the following reflections and arguments will make it even more
obvious that there is a structural similarity between the views of Nietzsche
and those of transhumanists, even though the sound in which they put
forward their understandings of the world differs significantly. The
inspiring articles by Babich and Loeb provide an excellent basis for
clarifying some specific issues, which are closely related to the debate, so
that the views of Nietzsche and those of transhumanists become clearer. In
addition, I use some insights gained from these exchanges to put forward
new perspectives and values by developing further selected arguments that
have been put forward by Nietzsche as well as by transhumanists.

